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Abstract
In their recent editorial Mannion and Braithwaite provide an insightful critique of traditional patient safety 
improvement efforts, and offer a powerful alternative vision based on Safety-II thinking that has the potential 
to radically transform the way we approach patient safety.  In this commentary, I explore how the Safety-II 
perspective points to new directions for organisational learning in healthcare organisations.  Current approaches 
to organisational learning adopted by healthcare organisations have had limited success in improving patient 
safety.  I argue that these approaches learn about the wrong things, and in the wrong way.  I conclude that 
organisational learning in healthcare organisations should provide deeper understanding of the adaptations 
healthcare workers make in their everyday clinical work, and that learning and improvement approaches should 
be more democratic by promoting participation and ownership among a broader range of stakeholders as well 
as patients.  
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Introduction
In their insightful editorial Mannion and Braithwaite1 
consider “false dawns and new horizons” for the still relatively 
young patient safety discipline. Their contribution is a critical 
analysis of the early and current patient safety research 
efforts, which have been frequently overly optimistic, and 
which have been, at times, simply too naïve. The outlook they 
provide has the potential to radically change the way we look 
at patient safety. Rather than framing safety as the absence 
of harm (referred to as Safety-I), which comes with negative 
connotations such as human error, they offer a vision wherein 
safety (Safety-II) is described in the affirmative – as the ability 
to navigate successfully the stresses and tensions present in 
any modern day complex system.2 This is a fundamental shift 
in perspective, which has gained increasing popularity in the 
traditional safety-critical industries,3,4 and which we are now 
starting to embrace in healthcare.5-9 
In this commentary, I explore how the Safety-II perspective 
points to new directions for organisational learning in 
healthcare organisations. Right from the start of the 
mainstream patient safety movement, policy-makers 
identified organisational learning as a key strategy for 
improving the safety of care.10 This was emphatically reiterated 
in the Berwick report (suitably entitled “A promise to learn 
– a commitment to act”) following the investigation into the 
failings at Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust. The report 
emphasised that the National Health Service (NHS) needed 
to become a system that was devoted to continuous learning 
and improvement.11 Even though there has been sustained 
focus on improving patient safety through organisational 
learning, healthcare organisations are struggling to generate 
useful learning and to translate learning into meaningful and 
sustainable improvements in practice.12-14 I argue that this is 
at least in part due to the focus of organisational learning as 
practised in healthcare organisations on adverse events and 
incidents, ie, on things that have gone wrong. This approach 
to learning only considers the few extraordinary situations, 
where a system has broken down, ie, we are only seeing half 
the story, at best.15 A Safety-II approach to organisational 
learning enables us to learn about why, most of the time, 
things go right, ie, the manifold adaptations in the system 
that prevent everyday disturbances and disruptions from 
becoming everyday catastrophes.16 I conclude that healthcare 
organisations could use the Safety-II perspective to create a 
more positive, inclusive and ultimately more effective learning 
environment for improving patient safety. 
Healthcare Organisations Fail to Learn
The literature on organisational learning is heterogeneous and 
broad, with no universally agreed definition.17 Organisational 
learning has been characterised as a continuous cycle of 
action and reflection, which can take place at different levels 
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(individual, group, organisation or even business sector).18 
Organisations have a range of learning processes at their 
disposal, both internal and external.19 However, in healthcare 
organisational learning has been implemented relatively 
narrowly. Healthcare organisations attempt to learn mostly 
from retrospective analysis of failures and incidents in order 
to prevent such events from happening again. In the NHS 
the National Reporting and Learning System (NRLS) was 
set up to collect and to aggregate data about incidents at a 
national level. NRLS was established in 2003, and to date over 
4 million incident reports have been submitted to the system. 
This number already far surpasses the roughly 1.25 million 
incident reports that are contained within the US Aviation 
Safety Reporting System (ASRS) – which was established 
in 1976. As far as the reporting of incidents is concerned, it 
could be argued that NRLS has been highly successful. But 
what about the learning from these vast numbers of incident 
reports? 
Longitudinal studies suggest that there is a lack of evidence 
that care has become any safer over the years.20-22 In addition, 
many commentators have provided critical analyses of incident 
reporting systems and other retrospective analysis techniques, 
such as root cause analysis.23-27 Criticisms that have been raised 
include inadequate feedback to people contributing incident 
reports, the lack of visible improvements to clinical practice, 
the development of weak improvement interventions, and 
the use of organisational learning approaches as tools for 
management rather than for improvement. In addition, 
incident reporting and root cause analysis can be perceived 
as contributing to the existing blame culture10 because there 
is a temptation to focus on what individuals did wrong.13 The 
breadth of these criticisms has prompted some to argue that 
these tools are part of the problem of the lack of progress on 
patient safety, rather than part of the solution.25,28 
Another important approach to encourage learning from 
experience in healthcare organisations is the use of indicators 
and trend data.29 Frequently, indicators tend to be lagging 
indicators, ie, outcome measures, such as the number of 
pressure ulcers or patient falls. Other indicators can be 
regarded as leading indicators and reflect aspects of healthcare 
processes. Examples include the percentage of patients for 
whom a venous thromboembolism (VTE) assessment has 
been undertaken, and the percentage of patients identified as 
at risk who have received VTE prophylaxis. I do not discuss 
further the use of indictors in the critique below, but mostly 
indicators are measures derived from the Safety-I paradigm. 
Hence, they provide information about adverse outcomes 
and sources of failure and unreliability, rather than about the 
extent to which a system is able to anticipate and to adapt to 
changes and disturbances.30 
Organisational Learning in Healthcare From a Safety-II 
Perspective
Looking at organisational learning for improving patient 
safety from a Safety-II perspective, I want to focus specifically 
on two aspects of current approaches that are fundamentally 
flawed: we are learning about the wrong things, and we are 
learning and improving in the wrong way. 
Mannion and Braithwaite suggest that patient safety research 
and practice should be concerned with what goes right rather 
than what goes wrong, ie, the focus should be on work-
as-done on an everyday basis. The focus of many current 
organisational learning approaches in healthcare, however, is 
specifically on adverse events and incidents. In this way, the 
learning is about what went wrong, what kinds of mistakes 
were made, and which barriers and safeguards have failed. 
While such insights can be useful, they are hardly adequate 
by themselves to provide a good understanding of safety in 
complex adaptive systems. Studies undertaken under the 
umbrella of resilient healthcare demonstrate that it is the 
ability of healthcare workers and clinical systems to adapt 
and to make dynamic trade-offs, which enables them to 
provide safe care in the face of disturbances, ambiguities, 
tensions and contradictions, and competing organisational 
priorities.8,31-36 Often, such studies provide rich ethnographic 
accounts of the adaptive strategies that healthcare workers 
adopt, such as sacrificing and reformulating goals, offloading 
of demands, pulling in extra resources, and trading risk 
based on subjective assessments of the needs of a clinical 
situation. The aim of learning and improvement should be to 
appreciate the positive contribution such adaptations make, 
and to identify ways in which this adaptive capacity can be 
strengthened.37 Unfortunately, studies of the practice of 
root cause analysis in healthcare suggest that the opposite is 
currently happening – solutions that are based on “learning” 
from these analyses tend to focus on training, the development 
of protocols, and reminders to staff to follow the rules.25 
Such solutions are reinforcing work-as-imagined rather than 
fundamentally challenging assumptions about what keeps 
patients safe.38 
A corollary to the focus on work-as-done is the need to make 
organisational learning in healthcare more democratic. When 
interviewing healthcare workers about reporting, learning 
and improving patient safety I was struck by how little staff 
who contribute to incident reporting were told about how 
the process works.39 A common expression used was that 
incident reports “disappeared into a black hole.” Staff were 
largely unaware of who would be looking at the reports, 
and whether or how learning would be generated. Incident 
reporting systems and root cause analyses are usually owned 
and overseen by risk management departments or patient 
safety officers, with little ownership by frontline healthcare 
workers. On the other hand, many of the actual improvement 
efforts appear to take place in less formal settings, such as 
lunchtime working groups or interdepartmental teams that 
have formed around a common improvement objective. 
In the literature the importance of these communities of 
practice has been recognised.40 It has also been suggested that 
the practice of organisational learning might be enhanced 
through an open political system, ie, a democratic approach 
where people have the psychological safety to speak up and 
create learning in dialogue and through constructive criticism 
of ideas and views.41,42 However, healthcare organisations 
have failed to embrace such efforts as part of their formal 
strategies for harnessing learning and improving patient 
safety. Organisational learning in healthcare is limited by this 
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dichotomy between formal risk management efforts aimed at 
bringing work-as-done in line with work-as-imagined, and 
frontline efforts directed at improving everyday clinical work. 
There is an urgent need to appreciate these latter efforts, and 
to embed them within the formal organisational learning 
strategy. 
New Directions
Examples of promising innovations in organisational learning 
can be found both within the increasing body of literature on 
resilient healthcare as well as beyond. A number of recent 
approaches focus on purposefully monitoring the adaptations 
(work-as-done) healthcare workers make to procedures 
and protocols (work-as-imagined).43,44 The aim of these 
approaches is not to identify violations and to constrain 
behaviour, but rather to understand the organisational 
context and the tensions within clinical systems. Healthcare 
workers are encouraged to provide feedback about procedures 
and protocols, and to document the adaptations they need 
to make. This can feed into a process of reflection about 
work-as-imagined and sharing of best practice. While this 
process is arguably still limited in terms of the solutions it 
generates (protocols and procedures), it supports adaptations 
through resilient procedures, ie, through providing different 
options and decision criteria to healthcare workers instead of 
prescribing a single, assumed best practice.45,46 
In my own work, I have used staff narratives about their 
daily “hassles” to document not only the manifold problems 
healthcare workers encounter every day, but also how they 
adapt to these problems and how they continue to deliver safe 
care.47 This process of “hassle reporting” is very simple, and can 
be empowering when healthcare workers are encouraged and 
supported by senior management to develop solutions within 
their own work environment. The focus on hassle and on how 
people deal with it avoids potentially threatening notions of 
human error and patient harm, and should thus reduce fear 
of repercussions. In this way, the process of learning can 
be geared much more easily towards improvement and less 
towards assignment of culpability. 
Similarly, an approach to learning from experience based on 
“excellence reporting” has been developed at Birmingham 
Children’s hospital, and is gaining popularity in the NHS.9 
This Learning from Excellence (LfE) approach encourages 
members of staff to report episodes of good practice that they 
have observed. This approach can provide learning about 
useful adaptations, and it can contribute to enhancing staff 
morale and workplace culture.9 
Interesting examples of how to make learning more democratic 
(ie, involve and give a voice to a broader range of stakeholders) 
can often be found in customer focused domains, such as 
retail and tourism, where there are many examples of popular 
rating and feedback sites that give a voice to customers. As 
healthcare is aiming to become more patient-centred, we are 
now seeing similar initiatives changing the way organisations 
can and should learn about the quality of care they provide. 
One such example is Care Opinion (https://www.careopinion.
org.uk/), which is a not-for-profit organisation running a web 
site and database, where patients can describe experiences 
with the care they have received. Healthcare organisations can 
(for a fee) access this feedback and use it as an input to their 
improvement efforts. 
In her role as citizen-patient, Carolyn Canfield reflected on 
the democratisation of healthcare, and the contribution of 
patients to resilient healthcare, and concluded insightfully: 
“Inviting past, present and future patients and their carers 
to grow from disempowered outsiders to become active 
participants will enhance health care’s need to comprehend 
quickly, flexibly and sensitively those components of care that 
only care recipients can perceive.”48 
Arguably, there is at present still a lack of studies that 
provide rigorous evidence about the benefits of adopting 
Safety-II approaches to support organisational learning in 
healthcare, or more generally of the contribution of Safety-
II to enhancing patient safety. The research focus has largely 
been on describing how individuals, teams and organisations 
anticipate and adapt successfully to changes and disturbances. 
While there exist experience reports describing practical 
implementation issues of Safety-II programmes,9,14,47,49,50 
further work is required to understand and to assess how 
Safety-II programmes can be implemented and improve 
patient safety. 
Conclusion
The importance of effective organisational learning to improve 
patient safety can hardly be overstated. The main approaches 
to organisational learning in healthcare based on incident 
reporting and root cause analysis have had limited success, 
and have attracted frequent criticism. While such approaches 
that attempt to learn from adverse events and incidents can 
be useful, complementary approaches are urgently needed. 
Building on the Safety-II perspective it might be possible 
to devise novel approaches to organisational learning in 
healthcare organisations that can provide richer insights into 
how complex adaptive systems deliver safe care; and that 
increase participation in and ownership of organisational 
learning among healthcare workers and patients.
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